Restarting the Dutch economy after the COVID-19 crisis by Beetsma, Roel & Gradus, Raymond
VU Research Portal
Restarting the Dutch economy after the COVID-19 crisis




Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Beetsma, R., & Gradus, R. (2022). Restarting the Dutch economy after the COVID-19 crisis. CESifo Forum,
22(6), 8. [2].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Dec. 2021
8 CESifo Forum 6 / 2021 November Volume 22
FOCUS
As was the case for most other economies in the 
eurozone, the Dutch economy was severely hit by 
the corona crisis. Yet, it is also clear that, likely due 
to its high degree of digitalization and the nature 
of its knowledge-intensive economic activities, the 
setback was substantially smaller than for some other 
economies with a sectoral structure more focused 
on direct interpersonal interaction, such as tourism. 
Also, the rather flexible labor market has been con- 
ducive in mitigating the economic downfall. Even 
in the midst of the crisis, unemployment hardly 
increased compared with the 2019 level, while there 
was still substantial turnover in the job market. Add-
ing to this the massive government support, the 
shrinkage of the economy was in fact smaller than 
at the height of the global financial crisis in 2009. 
According to CPB (2021b), the decline of GDP in 2020 
would have been 0.6 percentage point larger and 
unemployment would have been 65–180 thousand 
employees higher had no business support been 
given.
Now that, following a reasonably successful 
vaccination campaign,1 the corona crisis seems to 
be drawing to an end, the following question arises: 
what should the government do next in terms of eco-
nomic and financial policies? The background situa-
tion is one of an economic outlook improving faster 
than anticipated and an increasing labor shortage in 
many sectors, which can be explained partly by the 
aging of the population and partly by a mismatch 
between the skills of those leaving school or the 
university and what is demanded by employers. The 
number of vacancies has risen above unemployment, 
* All remaining errors are our sole responsibility.
1 End of August 2021 of those of 18 years or older 85 percent had 
received at least one vaccination, while more than 75 percent were 
fully vaccinated.
which is now close to its (low) pre-corona level. Em-
ployment in hours is not yet back at its original level 
due to labor market withdrawals, but is expected 
to increase fast if the economy stays on its current 
trajectory. The current juncture is one of substan-
tial uncertainty: while longer-run demand for labor 
will outpace its supply, a wave of bankruptcies in 
the aftermath of corona could temporarily alleviate 
labor market tightness and push employers into a 
wait-and-see mode. Indeed, the government has an-
nounced to wind down the general business support 
arrangements and will only continue to support spe-
cific sectors, such as the event industry and the tour-
ism sector. For example, the government announced 
that the borrowing facility for traveling agencies will 
continue until the end of 2021.
Besides the aging and increasing labor short-
ages, the other major long-term challenge of cur-
rent and future governments will be to handle the 
consequences of climate change and the transition 
from fossil to green energy. Both will require very 
substantial public and private sector investments. 
Notably, in this year’s Budget Memorandum (2021), 
the government announced that it will invest an ad-
ditional sum of over €6.8 billion in climate measures 
on top of the existing planned spending on climate 
policy in the coming years. In the following, we set 
out what are in our view the policy priorities after 
the corona crisis. 
THE SUPPORT MEASURES
Most support during the corona crisis has gone to 
businesses, mainly through generic measures, but 
also through support of a number of major individ-
ual firms.2 Support was initially conditional on not 
laying off employees. Later on, this condi-
tion was slightly relaxed. The rationale for 
the support was to prevent a sharp increase 
in unemployment and widespread business 
failure which, in turn, would further push 
up unemployment. Measured against these 
objectives the support policy was success-
ful. Unemployment stayed below 4 percent 
in 2020, while the number of bankruptcies in 
2020 is lower even than during the period be-
fore 2020 (Rabobank 2021).
The main measures on the expenditure 
side were a wage-cost compensation for firms 
with revenue losses (NOW), a compensation 
2 A detailed discussion of the various support measures is 
contained in Beetsma and Gradus (2021).
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for fixed costs (TVL), and temporary financial support 
for self-employed persons (TOZO). Each time package 
has been extended in principle by three months, while 
conditions have gradually become more favorable.3 
For example, while TVL was initially a fixed amount of 
4,000 euros and later on the maximum was 1.2 million. 
These generic support measures have expired end 
of September 2021, after which only specific sectors 
such as the event industry continue to be supported. 
Measures have also been taken on the revenue side, 
mainly by allowing companies to postpone payment 
of corporate taxes.
The current estimates of the aggregate discre-
tionary support are 35.4 billion euros in 2020 and 
29.9 billion euros in 2021.4 In addition, the govern-
ment has provided 50.3 and 41.6 billion in terms of 
guarantees in 2020, respectively 2021, of which more 
than half is for Next Generation EU (NextGenEU). Next 
to the generic support, some firms have also received 
individual support. The largest beneficiary was air-
line KLM, which received a 90 percent guarantee on 
a 2.4 billion loan from private creditors (part of the 
aforementioned total amount of guarantees), a jun-
ior loan of 1 billion from the government, and direct 
wage support of more than 1.2 billion euros (part 
of NOW).
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
At the moment of writing (September 2021), the Dutch 
economy is recovering quickly. Table 1, taken from 
Beetsma and Gradus (2021), provides the most re-
cent macroeconomic projections from the Nether-
lands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB 2021a). 
Projected GDP growth is well above 3 percent in both 
2021 and 2022. In 2020, unemployment increased by 
an unusually small amount for a recession (although 
part of the labor force withdrew from the labor mar-
ket), while it is expected to fall again in 2021 and to 
marginally increase in 2022. After a drop in 2020, em-
ployment is expected to grow in 2021 and 2022. The 
public finances look healthy, with public debt peaking 
at less than 58 percent of GDP in 2021. The public 
deficit deteriorated by almost 6 percentage points 
between 2019 and 2020 to 4.2 percent of GDP and is 
set to rise further to 5.4 percent in 2021, after which 
it is expected to fall back to 2.3 percent in 2022 when 
most of the discretionary support measures have ex-
pired. Hence, the deficit is well below the ceiling of 
the Stability and Growth Pact when the severe eco-
nomic downturn clause is expected to be de-activated 
(as of the start of 2023). Inflation is projected to be 
close to 2 percent in both 2021 and 2022, despite the 
pickup of economic growth and the fall in the individ-
ual saving share of disposable income.
3 In 2020, the second tranche was from 1 June till 30 September 
(Beetsma and Gradus 2021). 
4 The term “discretionary” is used to distinguish this support from 
the working of the automatic stabilizers. 
POLICY PRIORITIES
Now that corona lockdowns seem to be coming to 
an end, what should be the economic-financial pri-
orities for the Dutch government to restore from the 
economic devastation and make the economy fit for 
the long term?
Shorter-run Priorities
The priorities should address both the shorter and 
the longer run. The cabinet took the right decision 
to withdraw the generic business support by 1 Octo-
ber 2021. Support will only be continued for specific 
sectors that are still hurt by corona restrictions. In-
deed, there no longer is any macroeconomic rationale 
for generic support. The potential usefulness of any 
continued support would be at the microeconomic 
level, in terms of alleviating the personal misery of 
small business owners. However, for this there would 
be other instruments, such as subsistence support 
for those who need it, that do not (or to a lesser ex-
tent) distort the allocations of labor and capital of 
the business sector. After all, the longer the support 
lasts, the more firms will adjust their behavior ac-
cordingly, for example by raising their share of debt 
financing in the expectation that the government 
will come to the rescue when they become unable 
to service the debt (Boot 2021). Further, keeping weak 
firms afloat hampers the reallocation of production 
factors towards those firms where they can be put 
to the best use.5 This argument is of particular rele-
vance in a labor market with an increasing shortage 
of qualified workers. Individuals who lose their job in 
a badly performing firm will easily find a new job in 
which they are more productive. Finally, the longer 
support lasts, the more opportunities firms find to 
abuse the support.
While the government’s quick response to corona 
has helped to stem the damage to the economy, be-
5 Interestingly, there is clear evidence that weaker firms have made 
more use of the corona support than stronger firms. For a large sam-
ple of Dutch firms, Roelandt et al. (2021) demonstrated that firms 
that were less productive and less liquid before the crisis were more 
likely to make use of support.
Table 1 
Realizations and Projections for the Dutch Economy, in %
Year 2019 2020 2021 2022
Real GDP growth   2.0 – 3.8    3.9    3.5
Unemployment level   3.4    3.8    3.4    3.5
Employment change 
(hours)
  2.1 – 2.7    2.3    1.8
Inflation (HICP)   2.7    1.1    1.9    1.8
Budget balance (GDP)   1.7 – 4.2 – 5.4 – 2.3
Debt level (GDP) 48.5   54.3  57.5 56.5
Individual saving
(disposable income)
   4.5   11.6   11.4    6.8
Source: This table is taken from Beetsma and Gradus (2021). Figures in the table are based on CPB (2021a, August).
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cause of the urgency the eligibility conditions were 
light and so were the checks on whether firms fulfilled 
these conditions. Based on the tax office’s turnover 
figures in 2019 and 2020, Schellekens et al. (2021) sug-
gest that a substantial part of the business support 
was eventually unjustified,6 because a large fraction 
of the firms overestimated their sales losses. This 
was the case for an estimated 86 percent of the firms 
that applied for NOW 1.0 and 79 percent of the firms 
that applied for NOW 2.0. The average overestima-
tion of the revenue loss was 32 percent, while the 
estimated excess pay-out was 33 percent for NOW 
1.0 and 37 percent for NOW 2.0, or 4.2 billion euros 
in total. Moreover, more than 50 percent of the firms 
that applied for postponement of their tax payments 
experienced only a limited revenue reduction or even 
saw their revenues increase. Both for budgetary rea-
sons and out of fairness to the taxpayers, it will be 
important to claim back any of the excess support 
given to firms.
A related matter that will land on the policymak-
ers’ desks is how to deal with the tax liabilities built 
up by firms during corona. To alleviate the financial 
pressure on firms the government has extended the 
maximum term to pay taxes to 60 months. There has 
been discussion about forgiving (part of the) tax ob-
ligations. So far, the government has refrained from 
the cancellation of tax obligations. No doubt, however, 
once tax arrears start threatening business continuity, 
pressure to forgive tax obligations will increase. How-
ever, this would come at the expense of taxpayers and 
blunt the competitive edge of well-functioning firms 
that do not benefit to the same extent from forgive-
ness. Finally, canceling tax obligations would only 
alleviate indebtedness of the business sector towards 
the government, if other creditors do not come for-
ward too. It would in fact be a subsidy to these other 
creditors, mainly banks, because they can recover a 
larger fraction of their own claims.
The Netherlands is one of the two countries so far 
not to have submitted a recovery plan in the context 
of NextGenEU.7 The current, outgoing government 
considers this the task of a new government. The re-
covery plan would require the government to specify 
reform measures (in areas identified earlier by the 
European Commission) and invest in digitalization and 
climate. On the one hand, there may be a reluctance 
in binding the next government to reforms that it may 
not embrace. On the other hand, however, EU funding 
of investment would be more than welcome, as the 
climate transition requires huge investments in the 
coming decades, such as investments in the upgrading 
of the capacity of the electricity grid, which will be 
6 It is important to note that this finding does not necessarily point 
to firms intentionally trying to claim more than they have a right to. 
The overestimation of their losses is probably mostly driven by the 
severe uncertainty. Moreover, a “general-equilibrium” effect may 
also play a role: the “excessive” support may have dampened the 
economic setback to such a degree that in the end it obviated a sub-
stantial fraction of support at the individual firm level.
7 The other country is Bulgaria.
needed to distribute the increase in green electricity, 
and investments in a hydrogen infrastructure. These 
investments will take time to implement. Hence, the 
sooner these investments are started, the better. 
Therefore, the government (outgoing or incoming) 
would be advised to no longer wait and start drawing 
up a recovery plan. It is important to realize that the 
investment proposed under the recovery plan can 
only be a small part of the full investment agenda 
that we discuss below.
Long-run Challenges
The Dutch government faces a number of long-term 
challenges. The most important ones are dealing with 
an increasing shortage of labor, financing and imple-
menting the climate transition, and the position of the 
Netherlands in the EU.
The Increasing Shortage of Labor
The Dutch labor market was tight before the Covid-19 
crisis and now tightness is almost back at its pre-co-
rona level. Tightness can be expected to increase fur-
ther with the aging of the population. Shortages in 
the technical sectors are particularly large, but now 
they are emerging in many other sectors as well. What 
should be done? The government needs to develop 
an integral vision on how to meet long-run labor 
shortages.
First, invest more and better in education at all 
levels. While our economy is becoming increasingly 
knowledge-intensive, school achievements by pupils, 
in particular reading and calculus, are on a declining 
trend. This phenomenon was already present before 
corona struck. However, corona has given this trend 
an extra push. At the same time there are increasing 
shortages of teachers, and these shortages are largest 
in poor “problem” neighborhoods. While teacher jobs 
are increasingly complicated, with parents becoming 
more assertive and teachers effectively having to take 
more care over the children, pay is lagging market 
wages. Education of good teachers, with commen-
surate pay and differentiation in pay for those sub-
jects that are in the highest demand, will be essential. 
Focus should be on improving “hard” skills of pupils 
and avoiding drop-out from schools. Pupils that have 
dropped out from schools should be targeted to re-
sume their studies, for example by providing guaran-
tees for an internship. “Inclusiveness of education” 
is becoming a buzzword in the public debate. The 
step described here would benefit in particular youth 
from weaker socio-economic backgrounds, often from 
minority groups. The government should also raise 
investment in “hardware.” Many school buildings are 
dilapidated with unhealthy conditions inside, thus not 
contributing to the achievements of pupils.
While labor market participation has been on a 
rising trend since the turn of the century, with a sub-
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stantial fraction of the increase taking place through 
part-time work, there are still large groups not ac-
tively participating in the labor market, in particular 
people with a migration background. Many of those 
who are not participating failed to make it through 
school and are living on social assistance and some 
benefits. Politically, the easiest solution is to just 
leave them alone. However, the economy and so-
ciety would benefit if those along the sidelines are 
stimulated into entering the labor market, if needed 
after appropriate schooling. This requires a policy of 
active stimulation. Individuals would need to be ac-
tively targeted and be offered training, possibly with 
some guarantee of internship or a temporary initial 
job. These carrots would also need to be accompa-
nied by financial incentives. Marginal tax rates are 
relatively high in the Netherlands,8 while the loss of 
benefits and various other forms of support makes it 
financially unattractive to trade the status of receiver 
of benefits for that of employee.
At the tertiary education level, the number of 
students in higher education has gone up dramati-
cally, while public spending has not kept up, leading 
to large teacher-student ratios, thus putting pressure 
on the quality of the student turnout and raising work 
pressure on teachers. At the same time, “soft” studies 
such as festival management, leisure time studies, and 
the like, have become enormously popular. There are 
no incentives, other than those directly coming from 
the labor market, imposed on institutions of higher 
education to steer the relative sizes of their programs 
towards where the shortages are in the labor market. 
The game is to attract as many students as possi-
ble into programs that are relatively cheap to teach, 
thereby securing the financial viability of the depart-
ment responsible for the teaching. Young people have 
a hard time to see through this. The macro-result is a 
mismatch between what the labor market demands 
and skills and knowledge of the supply on the labor 
market. New labor market entrants are disillusioned 
and end up in areas they have not studied for (so at 
a lower wage than needed) or they need retraining. 
Where the market fails more steering from above will 
be needed.
More investment in education will not be suffi-
cient to eliminate future labor shortages. Life expec-
tancy continues to rise and to finance these higher 
pension and healthcare costs people need to work 
longer. This is indeed happening. The number of peo-
ple above 60 years who still work, full-time or part-
time, has increased enormously since the turn of the 
century, partly because the official retirement age 
(for a public pension) has gone up and because el-
derly workers are in a better shape than before. Im-
portantly, for the future there is also an automatic 
link between the (potential) increase of life-expec-
tancy and age for the public pension. This makes it 
8 The highest marginal income tax rate of 49.5 percent sets in at a 
relatively low level of income.
worthwhile for employers to invest through on-the-job 
training and courses in the skills of workers who are 
over 50 years, and it makes it worthwhile for the em-
ployees themselves to beef up their earnings capacity 
and remain attractive for the labor market.
A final source of labor would be immigration. Im-
migration of unskilled labor, often economic refugees, 
is unlikely to contribute significantly to solving labor 
market tensions. Language barriers and cultural dif-
ferences make absorption in the workforce difficult. 
Unemployment of people coming from Morocco and 
the Antilles is three times higher than average and for 
Turkish people it is 2.5 times higher. Immigration of 
skilled labor does contribute to reducing shortages 
in areas of high demand. This is what is already hap-
pening. There is a substantial net inflow of foreign 
students, a fraction of which start their working ca-
reer in the Netherlands. Companies in technical sec-
tors “import” high-skilled foreigners on a large scale. 
Unfortunately, the number of years during which they 
receive a tax advantage has been reduced.9
Climate Policy
The Dutch government has spent billions in subsi-
dies to stimulate driving electrically and for the pro-
duction of renewable energy. The cost of reducing 
emissions per tonne CO2 has been extremely high.
10 
Fortunately, the aforementioned subsidies are being 
built down. There are better ways to spend public 
resources on dealing with climate change. Indeed, 
an enormous investment agenda lies ahead, both in 
terms of the energy transition and in terms of protec-
tionary measures against natural disasters resulting 
from climate change. The latter would aim at dealing 
better with extreme weather in the form of droughts, 
flood from the rivers entering the country, and the 
rising sea level.
The energy transition requires a long-term invest-
ment agenda in which the private and public sector 
collaborate. Such long-term agenda is needed to pro-
vide the security needed to involve private parties, 
who have been complaining about the government 
changing its policies all the time. The main invest-
ments concern setting up parks that produce wind 
and solar energy and infrastructure investment, in 
particular increasing the capacity of the electricity 
grid (to enable the transportation of green electric-
ity) and in the infrastructure for the transportation of 
hydrogen to be used mainly by the energy-intensive 
industry. It is important to realize that, along with the 
cost of financing these investments, there will also 
be a benefit in terms of innovation that increases the 
9 This is the so-called “30 percent rule”: essentially income taxes 
are levied on 70 percent of gross income. 
10 According to a study by Dutch court of audit the cost of reducing 
emissions per tonne CO2 by electronic cars was in 2018 approximately 
1,700 euros. Gradus et al. (2017) shows a saving of 1 tonne of CO2 
through plastic recycling costs 180 euros in the Netherlands—also far 
higher than alternatives for saving CO2, such as wind energy (€30).
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efficiency of the transition and that may produce new 
export opportunities.
While with falling costs, investments in solar and 
wind energy production currently earn themselves 
back, the role of the government in bringing about 
the necessary infrastructure investments will be cru-
cial. First, the government would need to initiate ma-
jor infrastructure investments and coordinate these 
projects with the various private parties involved. 
Second, the government may need to provide co-fi-
nancing or guarantees to the private parties involved. 
Beetsma et al. (2021) propose to set up a public-pri-
vate investment bank designed specifically for the 
financing of these infrastructure projects. New public 
resources would not be needed, because the bank 
would replace the so-called Invest-NL and National 
Growth Fund, which are funded by the government 
to (help) finance growth-promoting investments. The 
bank would hold a long-term view with regard to its 
investments and not be subject to daily pressures 
from financial markets. This would also facilitate long-
term commitments by the government. It would also 
draw in the right type of investors, which includes 
pension funds and insurance companies since they 
have long-term liabilities. However, other financi-
ers with a long-term perspective would also be wel-
come. The presence of private sector parties is crucial, 
though. On the one hand, they provide part of the 
financing and share in the revenues and risks. On the 
other hand, they encourage a business approach, in 
which investment projects will be evaluated in the 
same way as regular commercial investment projects 
are evaluated for selection.
Stance on the EU
Unlike some other countries, and despite the impor-
tance of the EU internal market for the Netherlands, 
the Dutch political establishment does not seem to 
have a clear position as to the direction in which they 
would like to see the EU to develop and what should 
be the Dutch position in the EU. The consequences 
can be damaging. For example, mainstream politics 
is critical of new arrangements involving transfers 
to other parts of the EU but does not form a view 
on how they should be designed if the Netherlands 
is confronted with such plans by the Commission or 
other countries. This was the case with NextGenEU, 
which was backed by Germany, the most important 
partner country. Not participating was not an option, 
while the room for having its design amended was 
very limited. The report by the European Economy Ex-
pert Group (2021) describes four possible “integration 
preferences” (on the side of the Dutch government) 
with consistent policy packages leading towards a 
stable and resilient European economy. These pref-
erences differ in terms of speed (gradual or acceler-
ated), uniformity (all Member States simultaneously, 
or multi-speed), and the main mechanism (policy co-
ordination or market discipline). Besides this, it will be 
important for Dutch politics to realize that the Neth-
erlands is a geo-political dwarf and that, if it has the 
ambition to exert any influence in the world arena, 
this should be done as part of the EU as a bloc.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Now that the corona-pandemic is largely behind us 
and the Dutch economy is recovering quickly, its gov-
ernment needs to return to its long-run policy priori-
ties. This would require a long-term strategy in terms 
of how to secure a sufficient supply of qualified la-
bor to keep the economy going and a plan on the 
appropriate investments in the energy transition and 
in dealing with the consequences of climate change, 
and how to finance these investments. Besides these, 
the government needs to develop a view on how it 
would like to see EU develop and what would be the 
place of the Netherlands in the EU. 
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